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I am not going to talk services or U.S. competitiveness. I would
really like to talk about the politics of the Uruguay Round and the
politics of trade in the United States. But first, as the third speaker,
there have been some things said that I want to pick up on so we
can have a little discussion later. I am speaking particularly of Mr.
Hunnicutt's paper which has so much in it that I was taking notes
all the way through his presentation. I agree with much of it, but
that is no fun. Therefore, I will raise a couple of questions from
the other side.
He presented a terrific paper from a lawyer's point of view, but
I think one of the problems with American trade policy is that it is
dominated too much by legal thinking and uninformed economic
thinking. I think that this is true particularly with regard to unfair
trade practices. If there is one thing one should tell a group of lawyers
who are going to go out and represent clients on either side of the
trade issue, whether for protection or open markets, is that trade
flows between countries are overwhelmingly determined by macro-
economic policies and not by unfair-trade or fair-trade policies. Most
economists would estimate that the bilateral trade flows between the
U.S. and Japan would change only 10 to 15 percent at the most if
all the unfair trade practices on both sides were eliminated. Trade
deficits stem from the fact that we are spending too much and not
investing enough. We are consuming more than we are saving and
the Japanese are doing the reverse. I just read a paper that one of
the advisory committees wrote to Ambassador Hills which made the
point that the Japanese "over save". If we could "over save" a little
more we would be in better shape.
Second, trade law does not have a lot to do either with our trade
balance with the rest of the world or with U.S. competitiveness. If
one takes the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act as an
example, it is largely irrelevant to our trade balance with the rest of
the world and it is probably counter-productive to U.S. competi-
tiveness. I'll come back to those points in a minute.
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One final point that Mr. Hunnicutt raised at the end was Peter
McPherson's speech at the American Enterprise Institute. I thought
at the time, and I think now, that I have never heard a speech with
more gall. For a Department of State or USTR representative to get
up and lecture the developing countries on special and differential
treatment when we're sitting here with textile quotas, automobile
quotas, steel quotas, machine tool quotas and the semi-conductor
cartel with the Japanese, strikes me as hipocracy in the extreme. I
agree indeed with Mr. Hunnicutt and with Mr. McPherson that from
an economists' view the policies of special and differential treatment
and import substitution are nonsense. But so are the same kinds of
policies that developed countries have put in place.
Now let me talk a little bit about the Uruguay Round and why it
is unique. When one looks back on the Uruguay Round, two particular
points about its politics become quite clear. One is the fragmentation
of the system of actors and the emergence, as Mr. Hunnicutt and
Mr. Kakabadse mentioned, of new players. There is an important
set of statistics that underlies this. These statistics have to do with
the emergence of new countries among the top twenty exporting and
importing countries from 1970 to 1984. Six new countries appeared
in that list in 1984. These are the top exporting countries in the
world: Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, China, Mexico, and Sin-
gapore. They replaced Poland, Denmark, Czechoslovakia, East Ger-
many and Austria. Similarly, a group of new countries appeared on
the list as the largest importing countries. This list included South
Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, China, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia.
The point is, that in both exports and imports new actors exist on
the trading scene. Though they began to appear in the Tokyo Round,
it is in this current Round that you will see the emergence of these
countries as players in the game. Their participation is clearly in their
economic self-interest. That leads me to a second point.
In most cases, though not all, it is no longer meaningful to talk
about issues in the GATT as North-South issues. In a few cases you
will probably find the developing countries formally acting together,
but the interests of the so-called Gang of Four-Taiwan, Korea,
Hong Kong, and Singapore-are very different from those of India
and Brazil because the former countries pursue different economic
and trade policies than do the latter. The differences between the
whole group of countries at the top of the economic spectrum and
those at the lower end of the economic spectrum are very marked.
It is very hard to tell the players without the score card. You would
have to find out what is the particular economic and political situation
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within a particular country. One of the things that represents hypocrisy
by the developing world is for a Taiwan or Korea to prance into a
negotiation and argue that it is a developing country in relation to
a particular sector when that country is competing both on a world
wide basis and at a comparative advantage as to that product. In
other words, these countries should be treated like any other country
in particular sectors, but not across the board.
The other distinguishing feature of this Round is the movement
into entirely new policy areas. The movement away from tariff ne-
gotiations and into negotiations that concern the individual economic,
social, and regulatory policies of particular countries will be the chief
characteristic of this round. I am referring to the so-called non-tariff
barriers of how one regulates banking, insurance or telecommuni-
cations. These are issues that are much closer to national sovereignty,
and that's what makes them very difficult. These are also issues that
are very easily covered with nationalistic rhetoric. The French are
masters at talking about cultural sovereignty when they really just
want to exclude others. The United States is becoming a master in
talking about security issues when it really wants to exclude other
countries and other companies. The so-called new issues that GATT
is dealing with across the board, whether relating to intellectual
property or services, are issues that are very different in quality and
kind from the issues that the GATT negotiating process has attempted
to deal with before.
Now, I would like to discuss the U.S. negotiating goals and relate
these to the negotiating goals of other countries and how they mesh.
The United States has a number of goals, of which the order of
priority has changed somewhat. Certainly, as you have heard this
morning, some breakthroughs have occurred in the new issues of
services, intellectual property, trade related investment issues and the
older issue of agricultural subsidies. Clearly, we are more advanced
in the movement toward a so-called post-industrial society or econ-
omy, and we have moved much farther into the services sector.
Therefore, it is in our national interest to have some set of rules
which allow us to deal with other countries on a rational and legal
basis.
The same thing is true for intellectual property. We are a country
whose comparative advantage is still in high technology. Issues con-
cerning intellectual property involve the protection of high-tech sectors
for a short period because of the high cost of developing a product.
This is true whether it is a pharmaceutical product or a new computer.
Also, the product's cycle, or the time for which one has a monopoly
1989]
GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L.
over the production and sale of that property, is becoming shorter.
Therefore, it is important to protect, at least to some degree, one's
investment.
Let me now turn to the politics of the negotiations. The service
sector members were almost unanimously in favor of the multilateral
negotiation. This was a shift in terms of our policy with respect to
both the service industries and those high-technology industries which
felt their comparative advantage would depend upon protection of
intellectual property. Politically, when Bill Brock began to push for
the GATT negotiations, he had behind him the services sector and
a number of companies, mostly in pharmaceuticals and electronics,
that were pushing for some multilateral regime to protect their in-
tellectual property. The rest of manufacturing industry was divided.
The agriculture industry was divided, at least at the beginning. Labor
was very much opposed to the negotiations. We had never entered
a multilateral negotiation with such division among the various ec-
onomic sectors.
The third area which I will only mention in passing is investment.
The companies in this sector tend to be supportive of the multilateral
negotiations, depending on the company's product. These are the so-
called multinationals. I refer to those American companies that al-
ready possess a global strategy. Intellectual property and services
became symbolic of the priorities of the United States while agriculture
was such a thorny issue. Clayton Yuetter, the U.S. trade negotiator,
could not return from the Uruguay Round and sell an agreement to
Congress until he achieved some breakthroughs in services or intel-
lectual property.
The other nations, as you would expect, have other priorities. It
is almost unprecedented to have the kind of progress that there has
been in terms of compromise on those foreign priorities in the Uruguay
Round. Usually, negotiations are conducted in an atmosphere of
crisis, which is what happened in Tokyo. There, the negotiators put
the agreement together at the last minute. There was a crisis where
one was unable to make any kind of grand compromise, and then
at the end of a series of 24-hour meetings a package was put together
which gave something to everyone. Now, the "something to everyone"
has to include both developing and developed countries. It must deal,
for example, with agricultural products for the lesser developed coun-
tries. One of the most important issues of all for the developing
countries as a group is the so-called "safeguard issues". This label
has to do with the kind of extra-legal GATT trade practices that the
developed countries have put in place over the last 20 or 30 years.
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These practices relate to quotas, temporary marketing agreements,
orderly marketing agreements, and the wide variety of tactics that
developed countries have used in basic industries such as textiles,
steel, and automobiles, to impede the nation's changing comparative
advantage to other countries.
In order for us to gain the compromises that we want in intellectual
property and in services, there is going to have to be some give on
the safeguards issue, as well as on agriculture as against the E.C.
and Japan. On these issues the United States stands with some of
the agricultural companies.
Another complication is the alternatives to GATT or to a multi-
lateral solution. Our political process is perfectly capable of accom-
modating and pursuing contradictory forces at the same time. While
we will continue to take the lead in the multilateral negotiations, we
have also flirted with another set of solutions which are embedded
in provisions of the trade bill, antidumping legislation, and the in-
creasing concern about foreign investment in the United States. Each
of these is contradictory to not only our policy in GATT but ultimately
to U.S. national interests.
There is no greater symbol of the perverse nonsense present in
Congressional discussions in the last two years than in the so-called
Super 301 Amendment. Representative Gephardt wanted us to uni-
laterally force other countries to cut their exports to the United States
by 10% per year. The 301 legislation, as it passed, may be considered
a compromise in only one sense. It allows the President, at the end
of a very destructive process, to get the United States off the hook.
It says that we will force other countries to the negotiating table on
the basis of unilaterally defined unfair trade practices. They must
agree to change those practices within a three year period or face
retaliation on part of the United States. We are defining what con-
stitutes an unfair trade practice, the time for its elimination, and the
retaliation if our demands are not met. It seems to me that this
certainly breaks the spirit of GATT. If we go against the Koreans
and others in telecommunications, we will have broken our pledge
at the Uruguay Round not to roll back open markets. We would be
rolling back the market in telecommunications if we go against a
particular country which possesses potentially open markets.
American antidumping laws are increasingly being used as a means
of stopping competition. They are a harassment tool. They are the
symbol of the so-called due process protection at which the United
States excels. Finally, the trade bill's flirtation with limiting foreign
investment in the United States is not only counterproductive to our
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GATT goal but is also against our own national interest. I now
understand we have another such bill before Congress.
In summary, we have another road that the United States is traveling
while we are simultaneously pursuing the GATT negotiations. I would
argue that this road is not only counter to our leadership in GATT,
but it is counterproductive to U.S. interests. We are not the only
violator, nor are we the worst. The E.C. has a worse antidumping
system than we do, though. I think that with regard to 1992 and
the unification of Europe, it is still an open question whether the
resulting Community will be more open or more protectionist. Their
domestic content requirements are certainly trade destroying and de-
flecting. They have a much more extensive subsidy system than we
do. The Air Bus is the classic example of where they have poured
billions of dollars into a project that may not ever be profitable from
the point of view of the market. We are now at a crucial turning
point. In the next year or two, we will see whether the GATT
negotiation will be successful because of the political will and desire
to make it such, or whether we will move in the direction of a more
fragmented and fractionalized system.
I personally do not think, as Lester Thurow said, that GATT is
dead and that we are moving towards trading blocs. There is no
conceivable trade bloc that I can imagine in Asia. The United States
alone is not a trade bloc. Nor is there anybody with which we could
align. The E.C. is the result of a long term process. One could argue
a great deal of fractionalization and trade distortion still exists. Thank
you.
Mr. Hunnicutt
I am afraid Mr. Barfield has not created much controversy by his
statement, because I genuinely do not disagree with it and that could
be demonstrated in lots of ways. In the mid 1980's when we had
the Carbon Steel cases pending at the International Trade Commis-
sion, which was the largest amount of trade impact in the unfair
trade allegations in U.S. history, if the I.T.C. and Commerce De-
partment had affirmatively found unfair trade and counterveiled, or
had imposed duties against everything alleged, it would not have
amounted to 5% of U.S. imports. So it is clear that the unfair trade
cases and the trade regulation regime including the escape clause are
not the major determinant of the large flows of international trade.
It may be that outside the GATT system, things like the Vienna
Convention on the Sale of Goods or the adoption of the harmonized
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code, these types of activities of the UNCITRAL Model Rules of
Commercial Arbitration, that these may be contributing more to the
opening up of world trade and increased economic activity than what
goes on at the GATT. That is not to say that the GATT issues are
not important and it also is not to say that from a political perspective,
in terms of response in the United States, Japan, or Europe to the
adjustments that are required in societies by changes in trade pattern,
these adjustments certainly would be possible if the people and the
decision-makers did not perceive a fairness in the system. This fairness
goal is often promoted, particularly for the American mind, by having
a set of rules and regulations that are understood and agreed to by
the parties in advance. To that extent the escape clause, the dumping
and countervail codes, and other GATT regulations are more im-
portant than simply the amount of trade that it packs.
Again, I do not necessarily disagree. As to special and differential
treatment are we the pot calling the kettle black? Am I associating
myself with Mr. McPherson's thoughts on the subject the pot calling
the kettle black, I do not really think so. We have a lot of self-
examination in the United States to do in terms of the semi-conductor
cartel moving toward a carbon steel cartel and other arrangements
which are not multi-lateralized much less even really GATT consistent
if they are multi-lateralized. I do believe, however that the United
States market is considerably more open and does not consist of the
really pervasive restrictions that you would find in many developing
countries. That is not to say that resolving the issues for the developing
countries will have any more impact on the world economy than
resolving of the minor issues relating to the U.S. economy because
they are more important in terms of economic impact. In terms of
the economic development of the developing world it is very important
for them to understand that what we are trying to argue is in their
interests that we are not competing with them.
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